[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2026-02-27)

Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com> Thu, 19 February 2026 22:01 UTC

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From: Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 14:01:26 -0800
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To: Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2026-02-27)
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The point of my blog post relevant to the discussion here is the section on
hybrids and the IETF. You did indeed not argue that there might be a NOBUS
backdoor in ML-KEM, but nor did anyone else on this mailing list imply that
this was your point.

Rather: TLS 1.3 has solid downgrade protections. Having a cipher that you
don't trust supported in the spec has absolutely zero consequences if you
do not wish to support it.

On Thu, Feb 19, 2026 at 1:37 PM Muhammad Usama Sardar <
muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> wrote:

> On 19.02.26 20:03, Salz, Rich wrote:
>
> I honestly want to know your technical reasons, but patience is finite
>
> If someone's patience is short, please take the time to address my concern
> which I hope is technical enough :)
>
> Is breaking formal analysis (as pointed in [0]) not a "technical reason"
> for the WG? Please show me a proof that ML-KEM is more secure than hybrid.
>
> For RFC8773bis, when a constant "zero" was replaced by a secret (external
> PSK), FATT was very worried about it and demanded me to do a formal proof.
>
> Now when a secret (EC)DHE is replaced by a completely new secret
> "shared_secret" coming from fancy new crypto, FATT will not be worried
> about it? How could it possibly be the case? I can't believe it. What am I
> missing? For transparency, please share the FATT report with the WG.
>
> Also, kindly share the name of the FATT point person for this draft and
> please give me permission to talk to him/her directly to avoid any
> misunderstandings by relaying via list/chairs.
>
> -Usama
> [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/M-dTIUXdG_x7OtweBcOCp0bFcZQ/
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-- 

Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto |
sschmieg@google.com