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[TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Fri, 10 April 2026 02:50 UTC

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Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 12:50:30 +1000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Apr 10, 2026 at 12:47:22AM +0200, Muhammad Usama Sardar wrote:

> FWIW: this draft has similar issues the WG has been discussing for pure
> ML-KEM for quite some time now. Hence, I*oppose* publication. Some
> preliminary cents below. I'll do more study and may share more details until
> the end of WGLC.

But actually, the concerns **are** quite different, because there's no
timewarp.  Future breaks are not a concern now.

> IMHO, /all/ such pure PQ thingies should be dispatched to CFRG Review Panel
> to get their attestation on security considerations.

You keep saying that, but this is not CFRG's rôle in this context.

> # /Security considerations/
> 
> FWIW: the security considerations are insufficient. Security considerations
> simply refer to FIPS, Sec. 3.4 [1], but I believe we should at the very
> least forbid deterministic signing with a MUST NOT, because deterministic
> signing may leave the door open for side-channel attacks and fault injection
> attacks.

The verifier has no means to know whether the signature is deterministic
or hedged, and the FIPS 204, Section 3.4 text seems sufficient:

    This document also permits a fully deterministic variant of the
    signing procedure in case the signer has no access to a fresh source
    of randomness at signing time. However, the lack of randomness in
    the deterministic variant makes the risk of side-channel attacks
    (particularly fault attacks) more difficult to mitigate. Therefore,
    this variant should not be used on platforms where side-channel
    attacks are a concern and where they cannot be otherwise mitigated.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!

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