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[TLS] Re: New Liaison Statement, "Liaison communication to IETF regarding draft-ietf-tls-mlkem"

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 06 April 2026 13:35 UTC

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Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 23:35:15 +1000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Re: New Liaison Statement, "Liaison communication to IETF regarding draft-ietf-tls-mlkem"
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On Mon, Apr 06, 2026 at 03:11:23PM +0200, Muhammad Usama Sardar wrote:

> Also, as a counter-argument to my position, can someone kindly show me
> that pure ML-KEM is /more/ secure than hybrid in the context of TLS
> protocol? Thank you.

65536-bit RSA is "more secure" than 2048-bit RSA, is that a compelling
argument to never use 2048-bit RSA, and always use 65536-bit RSA?
Any choice of cryptographic parameters is ultimately a tradeoff.

Admittedly, in this case hybrids mitigate additional risks without being
unduly impractical, but not everyone sees those risks in quite the same
light.  I agree that hybrids are prudent, and would like to see that
point clearly stated in the pure ML-KEM draft, but I very much don't
think standing in the way publication is sensible.  Rather, I see it
as a counterproductive loss of opportunity to recommend due caution.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!

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