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[TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 13 April 2026 17:50 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 04:30:34PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:

> Just to weigh in on this: I would support adoption of
> draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa. There is customer demand for
> composite certs, and I would like to get these implemented in the
> Windows TLS stack.

I don't know what sort of interoperability you are expecting with these,
I am strongly inclined to NOT implement any of the composite signature
algorithms, at least not in TLS.  It may be harder to fend off their
adoption in CMS, but ideally sit that out as well, until we either have
CRQCs and hybrids are pointless, or we don't have CRQCs and know why
we're never going to have them.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!

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